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We allow for principals to self-select into delegating (or not) the allocation decision to an 
agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game is obtained when they 
choose not to delegate. Nearly half the subjects choose to be a dictator and make the 
allocation themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, 
relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent (or the standard dictator game). 
Subjects self-selecting into the role of a dictator give less relative to those that pass the 
allocation decision to an agent. Finally, the distributional consequences of delegating, or 
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1. Introduction 
Delegation is an important management tool in organizations and is desirable for 
efficiency reasons, leader formation, nurturing of talent and to pass decision making to 
outside sources. Lately, the experimental literature has studied delegation in scenarios 
such as hierarchical structures (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; 
Oexl and Grossman, 2013; Gawn and Innes, 2019), bargaining (Ferhrstman and Gneezy, 
2001) or labour markets (Charness et al. 2012). The results from this experimental 
literature (Hamman et al. 2010, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012 and Oexl and Grossman, 
2013) point towards delegation being used as a tool to hide behind unfair decisions. That 
is, a principal may hire an agent to make self-interested or immoral decision that the 
principal would be reluctant to take more directly (Hamman et al., 2010). 
Hamman et al. (2010) studied allocation decisions under compulsory delegation 
and find that the amount redistributed to recipients is significantly lower than in the 
standard dictator game. In their structure principals do not make allocation decisions and 
need only to select agents for that decision. They find that principal’s choose agents that 
transfer lower amounts to recipients thereby increasing their payoffs. Principals select 
agents to maximize own payoffs. Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) employ a dictator game 
with four players: a principal, an agent and two recipients. They wanted to understand the 
responsibility attribution of delegated decisions by observing who is punished for unfair 
distributions. In their setting principals’ can divide own and recipients’ endowment 
themselves or pass the choice to an agent. Endowment can only be divided in two ways: 
fair or unfair (with unfair benefitting the principal). After observing the division of the 
endowment, one of the two recipients can punish the rest of the players by lowering their 
final earnings after the division of the endowment has been made. They find that 
delegation is effective at avoiding principals being held responsible for the unfair decision 
as recipients also punish agents for unfair decisions.  
In this paper we run experiments with a variant of the standard dictator game 
(Hamman et al., 2010) where the principals can decide on making the allocation 
themselves or pass the decision to an agent. An interesting outcome of endogenizing the 
delegation decision is that if the dictators decide on making the allocation decision 
themselves then we revert to the standard dictator game, that is, dictators directly decide 
on the transfer amount. If principals, however, decide to delegate then we have the 
decision making delegated to an agent and the delegation version of the game is 
implemented a la Hamman et al. (2010).  
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Even though a-priori non-consequential, as we know from prior experiments, self-
selecting in this way can impact decision making. There are two classic contributions 
along these lines. First are Hoffman et al. (1996), in what was a procedural variation, 
where they find that increasing social distance resulted in outcomes closer to the game 
theoretic prediction. Second are Cherry et al. (2002), where the allocation decision is over 
earned wealth, they obtain lower allocations with 95% of the dictators playing according 
to game theoretic predictions. Self-selecting into being a dictator is a procedural variation 
in our framework that could significantly impact allocations in our setting relative to the 
standard dictator game. In the delegation version of the game, following Hamman et al 
(2010), we can hypothesize that when agents delegate the allocation decision then we 
should expect significantly lower allocations relative to the standard dictator game. 
We proceed as follows; given that we are interested in the consequences of 
endogenous delegation, we first replicate the standard dictator game and the treatments 
in Hamman et al (2010) obtaining qualitatively similar results. As in Hamman et al (2010) 
we replicate that subjects redistribute less under compulsory delegation than under the 
standard dictator game.1 We also replicate their alternating delegation structure where 
players first play eight rounds of compulsory and then endogenous delegation. Again, we 
replicate their results obtaining qualitatively similar results. That is, once a lower social 
norm is established (in the form of lower transfers) in the prior compulsory delegation 
stage, it carries over to the endogenous delegation scenario.2 
In our experiments we find that dictators who decide on the allocation transfer 
significantly less to recipients compared to the standard dictator game. There is a clear 
significant effect when the role is self-selected with those taking on the role of dictator 
being less prosocial. Note that the amount transferred to recipients by principals who 
decide not to delegate in endogenous delegation (3.14 vs 3.84) is significantly greater 
than when the decision is delegated. Additionally, this amount (3.84) is significantly 
lower than what is obtained in the standard dictator game. Finally, and if delegation serves 
to pass on the responsibility of “immoral” decisions, we find that when the allocation 
decision is passed on to an agent the amounts are greater than when the principals 
                                                 
1This difference is significant using a Mann-Whitney test: z=8.234, p=0.00. 
2 Hamman et al. (2010) also run an endogenous delegation treatment with no competition amongst agents. 
That is, one can choose between delegating to the only agent available (the same for all the rounds) or not 
delegating and making the decision. In order to do this, they vary the payoff structure of agents since each 
agent can only work for one principal. They obtain that the majority of principal’s delegate and the 
amount shared with the recipients is similar to what was observed under the compulsory delegation 
treatment. 
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themselves decide and is not significantly different from the standard dictator game. 
Clearly, endogenizing the choice to delegate or not sorts agents into two types, ones that 
assume the role of a dictator and others that delegate3.  
Comparing our results with compulsory delegation we find that (as in Hamman et 
al., 2010) lowest allocations are obtained under this framework. When the principal´s 
choice is reduced to only choosing an agent they choose the agent that maximizes their 
own payoffs resulting in lower allocations. This amount is lower than that obtained under 
a principal self-selecting into making their own allocation decision, delegating the 
decision, or in the standard dictator game. The relationship between low amounts 
transferred and being selected for an agent is clear under compulsory delegation. This 
relationship is, however, weaker under endogenous delegation. Why this occurs is not 
clear. 
Ours is a procedural variation (a la the double-blind procedure in Hoffman et al., 
1996) of the standard dictator game that results in the distribution shifting towards lower 
allocations. This is also along the lines of Cherry et al. (2002) where 95% of the outcomes 
are according to game theory predictions when the dictator bargains over earned wealth. 
Our manipulation is “milder” than either and the results are still striking with the average 
allocation made by principals who do not delegate being 2.6 in the last four periods 
(relative to 3.5 when the decision is passed to an agent). Even though in a different 
environment, the sorting argument put forth by Lazear et al. (2012) may also be applicable 
here. While, in Lazear et al. (2012) individuals sort into those who share reluctantly, i.e. 
avoid the opportunity to share, in our case those that want to share less may sort into 
making the allocation decision themselves. 
One can look at our endogenous delegation experiment as a procedural 
manipulation where the dictator game is obtained as an outcome of individuals self-
selecting into the role. There are no features such as anonymity or earned wealth in our 
design where one earlier obtained stronger outcomes in favor of the game theoretic 
predictions. Given this our result is interesting as it shows that seemingly small variations 
can result in significantly different outcomes in the dictator game. One can say that by 
self-selecting the dictators may feel empowered, or individuals with certain 
characteristics (e.g., less pro-social) are likely to self-select into the role. One explanation 
                                                 
3 Note, this could also be related to other aspects such as confusion or lack understanding of the game. 
However, in our repeated framework this should not be a problem. 
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could be that under endogenous delegation the principal can keep the right to make the 
decision. Along similar lines are Collins et al. (2018) where entitlement over the power 
to divide an endowment affects the result. In our environment we could have that 
principals under endogenous delegation feel more entitled to share less than principals in 
the baseline or, as earlier mentioned, feel empowered when they self-select into the role. 
Finally, the knowledge of having an extra competitor (the principal) may also 
affect agent behavior and result in lower competition (Garcia and Tor, 2009). We can, 
however, rule this out. In our first treatment we inform the agents that the “Principals 
may make the choice themselves or delegate.” This suggests that the agents may view 
themselves as competing with the principals. To see if this was important to our results 
we made a subtle change in the instructions by running another endogenous delegation 
treatment (informationally closer to compulsory delegation) in which agents did not know 
that there is an alternative to choosing an agent. That is, they are only informed that 
“Agent A has to decide to delegate or not the decision”. They are not explicitly informed 
that the principals may make the decision themselves. We find no differences between 
these two endogenous delegation treatments. We can thus conclude that an agents’ 
decisions cannot be explained by differences in information or expectations of competing 
with the principal and has to do with the game structure.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The meta-study of Engel (2010) (data from more than 120 studies) shows that the average 
amount redistributed to recipients in dictator games represent 28% of the total4. The 
average amount allocated is sensitive to procedural variations. For example, it can 
increase if we vary social distance and dictators are identified by their surname (Charness 
and Gneezy, 2008) or if anonymity is not ensured (Hoffman et al. 1996). Furthermore, 
framing effects also vary the amounts transferred to recipients (Brañas-Garza, 2007; List, 
2007). Brañas-Graza (2007) shows that emphasizing the dictators’ responsibility over the 
outcome increases dictators’ generosity. List (2007) shows that framing affects the 
outcome by changing the instructions and asking dictators to take money from recipients 
instead of asking them to split the endowment. Finally, in their classic paper Cherry et al 
(2002) show that a large proportion of the outcomes are as predicted if the endowment is 
earned by the dictators. It is clear that procedural variations (social distance, framing or 
                                                 
4 Similar average amounts are obtained by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) who perform a similar analysis 
with dictator games conducted in developing counties. 
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earned money) can significantly impact the allocations dictators make, with some 
increasing allocations while, others significantly decrease them. 
Some of the delegation literature has also used the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 
1994) to study distributional consequences of hierarchical delegation (Hamman et al. 
2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Gawn and Innes, 2019). The main result from this 
literature is that delegation results in less egalitarian outcomes than the standard dictator 
game. In addition, Gawn and Innes (2019) try to understand the effect of endogenous 
delegation in a one-shot dictator game with no punishment option nor agents where 
principals can choose to delegate or not, knowing that if you delegate the decision of 
another dictator playing in another session will be randomly implemented. They find that 
those who delegate are the more generous dictators in a simple dictator game with no 
delegation option.  Others have studied delegation using the ultimatum game (Fershtman 
and Gneezy, 2001) and labor market environments (Fehr et al. 2010; Charness et al. 2012 
and Maximiano et al. 2013). The bargaining literature also finds that compulsory 
delegation increases the proposers share. 
Besides the studies mentioned above Oexl and Grossman (2013), Coffman (2011) and 
Garofalo and Rott (2017) extend previous results. The first ones find that intermediation 
reduces principal’s punishment. Oexl and Grossman (2013) find that by delegating to an 
intermediary, a principal can effectively shift blame onto the agent even when doing so 
necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair outcome. Coffman (2011) studies 
punishment in a scenario in which the punisher is not affected by the endowment 
decisions made by principals and agents finding that when delegation is implemented 
principals are punished less and obtain higher profits. Finally, Garofalo and Rott (2017), 
also find that recipients punish both principals and agent for unfair decisions when the 
agents' only role is to communicate the decision made by the principal.  
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) use an ultimatum game in which proposers can 
delegate the offer made to the recipient to an external agent. They find that when 
delegation is chosen the payoffs of the proposers’ increase. Choy et al. (2015) also use 
the ultimatum game to compare exogenous and endogenous delegation in a bargaining 
environment and find that proposals are higher under compulsory delegation. They also 
find a difference between endogenous and exogenous delegation. Overall there is a 
common theme in all these papers, delegation increases payoffs of the proposer/sender 
under delegation. 
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There are other papers that have studied the joint effect of delegation and other 
factors such as dishonesty, corruption, information, gender5 or bargaining. Erat (2013), 
Drugov et al. (2014) and Sutan and Vranceanu (2016) examine dishonesty in 
environments with endogenous delegation of decisions. Sutan and Vranceanu (2016) use 
a dictator game in which proposers can lie about delegating to a third party. They find 
that imperfect information increases proposer profits by shifting blame6. Similarly, Erat 
(2013) showed that agents are more frequently hired when they have to lie in a sender 
receiver game7. Drugov et al. (2014) find that intermediaries facilitate corruption not by 
reducing the responsibility for the outcome but rather by lowering the moral cost of 
cheating in a bribery game. 
Overall the literature finds that allocations under delegation favour the principal 
(Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman, 2013) and 
that principal’s select agents that maximize own payoffs (Hamman et al. 2010; Bottino et 
al. 2016). We also know that procedural variation such as the double blind (Hoffman et 
al, 1996) and earned money (Cherry et al, 2002) result in outcomes closer to the game 
theoretic prediction. Based on this our main hypotheses are: 
• Hypothesis 1: Overall, we expect transfers under Endogenous delegation 
to be greater than Compulsory and lower than the standard dictator game 
allocations.  
• Hypothesis 2: Self-selecting into making the allocation decision 
themselves will give us lower allocations than in the standard dictator 
game. 
• Hypothesis 3: Self-selecting into passing the allocation decision will give 
the same outcomes as in the compulsory delegation game and 
consequentially lower allocations than in the standard dictator game. 
• Hypothesis 4: Agents making allocation decisions favorable to the 
principal will be selected more often under endogenous delegation.  
                                                 
5Bottino et al. (2016) show that in a compulsory delegation game female and male principals behave 
similarly while as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts 
(even though it is detrimental to them as they are selected less often). 
6Lai and Lim (2012) study the effect of information and communication on delegation (without the cheating 
option) and find that generally principals under-delegate even when it is more profitable to do so. 
Furthermore, Cettolin and Riedl (2010), use delegation to prove that under uncertainty there is a violation 
of rationality in decisions.  
7Surprisingly dishonesty in the sender-receiver game with agent is prevalent even when the identities of 
cheaters are revealed to other players (Van de Ven and Villeval, 2015). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes our experimental 
design in detail. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3. Experimental design 
Our design follows Hamman et al (2010). A total of 236 subjects were recruited 
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for the experiments at Middlesex University London8.Each 
subject participated in one treatment only. In addition to the experimental earnings, 
subjects were paid a £5 show-up fee plus £2 for completing a series of questionnaires 
after the experiment. The experiment lasted for approximately 45 minutes and subjects 
earned on average £12 in total. We conducted a total of 15 sessions (see Table 1 for a 
summary of the experimental design). 
The experiment consisted of four treatments. Besides the standard dictator game, 
each delegation treatment involved playing a modified dictator game with or without the 
delegation option. Each session had 8 or 10 subjects9. Upon arrival participants were 
randomly allocated their roles and seats, read the instructions in their computer screen 
and were informed of their role in the experiment. Hereafter, we refer to the principal 
(player P), agent (player A) and recipient (player R).10The experiment lasted for 12 
rounds. Each participant was assigned a role and an identification number for the entire 
experiment. The identification number guaranteed anonymity to each participant. They 
were also told they would be randomly re-matched in each round. At the end of the 12th 
round subjects were asked to fill two brief questionnaires. The first one included some 
socio-demographic questions while the second was related to the decisions taken during 
the experiment11. They were paid £2 for completing the questionnaires. 
Our payment scheme is a variation of the one in Hamman et al. (2010)12. Both 
principal and recipient were paid in cash for one randomly selected round drawn at the 
end of the experiment. Agents were given a £5 show-up fee and £5 as starting capital at 
the start of the experiment. Their payment was calculated as follows: 
 
                                                 
8Instructions can be found in Appendix E. 
9The group size depended upon show up. 
10To avoid framing, in the instructions we referred to the participants as “A”, “B” and “C” instead of 
“principal”, “recipient” and “agent” respectively. 
11See Table 1 in Appendix B for a summary of the answers to the second questionnaire. 
12 We modified the coefficients of the payment equation to adapt it to the amount of players that we had 
per session. 
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𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = −0.30 + 0.15 ∗ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 
 
Where, 0.30 represents the fixed costs that agents face in each period regardless 
of being selected by a principal. 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the number of principals choosing agent i. At the 
end of the experiment, each participant received a sealed envelope with their 
identification number and the amount they earned. We have a total of four treatments and 
three different delegation mechanisms (See Figure 1). 
 
Baseline (BS) 
The BS treatment is the standard dictator game. An initial endowment of £10 is 
assigned to each pair formed by one principal and one recipient. Each principal decides 
how much of the endowment to allocate to the recipient. Once the decision is taken 
recipients are informed of their earnings. In each round, principals are told that they 
have to divide an endowment of £10 between themselves and a randomly matched 
recipient. The treatment had 40 participants participating in 4 sessions. 
 
Endogenous Delegation (ED-1) 
In this treatment we had 96 participants in 11 sessions. A third player, the agent 
(A), is introduced (Hamman et al., 2010). Principals can pass on the allocation decision 
to one of the two available agents, A1 or A2, or make it themselves.13 The agents are 
informed that the principals can delegate or make the decision themselves. The two 
agents thus know that they are competing amongst themselves and the principal. 
Note that, the knowledge of this extra competitor may generate beliefs (of 
agents) on the principal affecting agent’s behavior and resulting in diminished 
competition (Garcia and Tor, 2009). We thus ran another treatment where we made the 
ED treatment informationally closer to the CD experiments. That is, we only inform the 
agents that the “Each principal has to decide to delegate or not the decision of dividing 
the endowment on one of the two agents”. Informationally, this treatment lies between 
CD and ED-1. This is the treatment ED-2 below. 14 
                                                 
13 Following Hamman et al. (2010) we also run an ED treatment with 15 participants (3 agents, 7 
principals and 7 recipients) and found that our main results remain constant when the size of the market is 
bigger. The results of this extra treatment can be found in Appendix D. 
14 Following Hamman et al (2010) we also ran a treatment in which subjects participate in a CD treatment 
for 6 rounds and ED-1 during the last 6 rounds. We replicated this treatment for consistency reasons. Our 
results replicate those of Hamman et al. (2010) where they observe that the behaviour in CD and ED rounds 
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Endogenous Delegation without Information (ED-2) 
As mentioned earlier in this treatment the agents were only informed that the 
principal chooses to delegate or not to them (see instructions in Appendix E). Recall that 
in ED-1 agents knew that compared to compulsory delegation, they had an extra 
competitor, the principal. We ran this treatment in order to test whether the explicit 
knowledge of having an extra competitor, affects agent behavior. We had 56 participants 
participating in 6 different sessions. 
 
Treatment 4: Compulsory Delegation (CD) 
This is a replication treatment (Hamman et al., 2010). The agent makes the 
decision regarding the division of the endowment between the principal and the recipient. 
Each session has two agents: A1 and A2. The principals select one of the two agents to 
divide the endowment in each round.15 We run five sessions with a total 44 participants. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the experimental design 
 
 
                                                 
is similar. In both cases the amounts given to the recipient are low and decrease over time. The results of 
this treatment are in Appendix C. 
15In Hamman et al. (2010), principals were randomly allocated to an agent at the beginning of period 1, 
introducing the possibility of choosing one agent or the other from round 2 onwards. This study will differ 
as principals choose an agent on every possible round, including round 1. We chose not to impose one 




















Sessions 4 11  6 5  
Number of 
subjects 
40 96  56 44  
Principals/Agents
/Recipients 
20/-/20 37/22/37  22/12/22 17/10/17  




Figure 1: Summary of the experimental design 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Overall results: 
We use the pooled data from the two ED treatments (-1 and -2) in this analysis. Recall, 
that the ED-2 was run to test whether the explicit knowledge of having an extra competitor 
(the principal) affects agent behavior. We find that agents reallocate similar amounts in 
both treatments, ED-1 where agents know that the principal can select an agent or not 
delegate and ED-2 where agents do not know the alternative to not choosing them. We 
found no significant differences between the two treatments (ED-1: average transfer 3.47 
and ED-2: average transfer 3.49; Mann-Whitney test, z= 0.383, p= 0.701)16.  We refer to 
the pooled data as ED henceforth. Further, we refer to those who delegate under ED as 
ED-D and those who do not as ED-N. 
We now compare allocations under Endogenous Delegation with Compulsory 
Delegation and the dictator game. We find that the overall allocations under the standard 
dictator game is 3.56.  Meanwhile, for the CD and ED treatments the average amounts 
shared are, 2.55 and 3.48, respectively (Table 2 below). A Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) test 
(Table 3) confirms that the distributions obtained under the standard dictator game and 
ED treatments are not different (z=0.982, p=0.326). The outcomes under the standard 
dictator game (BS) and CD are however significantly different (z=8.23, p=0.00) with the 
                                                 
16 Appendix A contains a more detailed comparison between ED treatments 
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average allocations in the BS being significantly greater. Our main result is the 
comparison between the CD and ED treatments. We find that the average allocation under 
the ED treatment is significantly higher than under the CD treatment and the results are 
significantly different (z=-7.32, p=0.00). 
 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviations per treatment 
 Mean SD 
Baseline 3.566 2.095 
CD 2.558 2.793 
ED 3.481 3.062 
ED1 3.474 2.869 
ED2 3.494 3.368 
 
 Table 3 - Mann Whitney Test 
 z p 
BS-CD 8.234 0.000 
BS-ED 0.982 0.326 
CD-ED -7.320 0.000 
 
We find that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed for the ED-CD comparison but, weakly 
confirmed for the ED-BS comparison. We summarize our findings below. 
 
Result 1: Overall, allocations under endogenous delegation are significantly 
higher than under compulsory delegation. The outcomes under endogenous delegation, 
however, are not significantly different than under the standard dictator game in the 
baseline treatment. 
 
4.2. Delegators (ED-D) and Non-Delegators (ED-N): 
 Under endogenous delegation individuals self-select into making the allocation 
decision (as a dictator) or passing it to an agent. As mentioned earlier, if one does not 
delegate then the game reverts to the standard dictator game (with the procedural 
difference that individuals choose to make the allocation decision). If they, however, 
decide to delegate then it is similar to the delegation game in Hamman et al. (2010) (again 
with the caveat of self-selecting into a role). The predictions regarding what we expect 
under the two scenarios are given by Hypothesis 2 and 3.  
A priori, self-selecting into playing the role of the dictator should give us the same 
allocations as under the standard dictator game experiments (BS treatment) and 
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delegating the decision to an agent will give the same outcomes as under the CD 
treatment. However, we know from the many experiments with procedural variations that 
the allocations can go one way or another. In our case, self-selecting into the role 
empowers the dictator and hence we conjecture that allocations should decrease. 
We will first look at the outcomes under no delegation, ED-N. Hypothesis 2 
predicts that amounts allocated under ED-N will be the smaller relative to the standard 
dictator game. Note that even though we have no reason to assume a-priori that we should 
observe any other result, we know that procedural (Hoffman et al, 1996) double-blind 
experiments and earned-money (Cherry et al, 2002) manipulations do matter. Further, 
from the recent work by Lazear et al (2012) we know that individuals can sort out into 
different types. Given this we hypothesize that those self-selecting into the dictator role 
will allocate lower amounts. 
Outcomes under ED-N are significantly different both from the DG (z=2.07, 
p=0.04)  and ED-D (z=2.83, p=0.00). Also note that the amount allocated by principal´s 
acting as dictator´s (3.84 on average in ED-N) is significantly higher than the amounts 
allocated under CD (z=-7.92, p=0.00).17 We thus find lower allocation relative to 
delegation (ED-D, 3.14 on average) and the standard dictator game, however, allocations 
are higher than under CD. Though it still results in lower allocations to the DG this may 
be due to the fact that our procedural manipulation was not as strong as that observed 
under Hoffman et al (1996) or Cherry et al (2002). However, the result is surprising given 
the mild variation we implemented. 
Figure 2 shows the amount transferred to recipients by round in each of the 
treatments: BS, CD and for those who delegate and don´t (ED-D and ED-N). We find that 
the DG follows a similar pattern to those that delegate under endogenous delegation (ED-
D). A Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) test of distributions confirms that the populations of BS 
and ED-D are not significantly different (z=0.00, p=0.99).18 We find that both Hypothesis 
2 holds meanwhile, hypothesis 3 does not hold. This gives us our Results 2 and 3. 
 
Result 2:  
                                                 
17The amounts allocated to recipients are also higher in BS (z=8.23, p=0.00) than in CD. 
18 Finally, a comment on the distributional outcomes. One can easily check for inequality across periods 
and treatments using the Gini index. We obtain that the Gini coefficient has a higher value in CD (0.44) 
than in BS (0.29), ED-N (0.43) or ED-D (0.41). This shows that, CD generates more inequality, while BS 
creates the lowest inequality among the treatments. Meanwhile, the standard dictator game and ED results 
are similar. 
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Under endogenous delegation (ED), those that self-select into dictators (ED-N) 
transfer significantly less to recipients relative to the standard dictator game. 
Result 3: 
 Under endogenous delegation, those that pass the allocation decision to an agent 
(ED-N) allocate similar amounts compared with the standard dictator game (Baseline 
treatment), and significantly higher amounts compared with Compulsory Delegation. 
 
 One interpretation of our results could be that sorting results in splitting the sample 
among those that are less or more pro-social. That is, those that decide (not) to delegate 
are (less) more pro-social than the others. This has to be treated with caution as most 
participants switch between roles. We can, however, look for the relationship between 
the number of times the role of dictator is chosen and allocations henceforth. We find that 
the average amount transferred by individuals who delegate in more than half of the 
rounds is statistically higher than the quantity transferred by those who choose to delegate 
in less than half of the rounds (z=-3.76, p=0.00). We find that those who delegate less, 
i.e. decide themselves, earn more. This may suggest that self-selecting may sort 
individuals into the less and more prosocial. 
In Table 4 we present the results for what proportion of principals’ delegate and 
the average amount allocated by principals (ED-N) and agents (ED-D). We find that 
delegation occurs in roughly 50% of the cases.19,20 
Figure 2: Amounts earned by the recipient by round and treatment 
 
                                                 
19We ruled out potential informational asymmetries affecting our results by running ED-1 and ED-2 and 
obtaining the same results. 
20 One potential explanation for this result could be that the size of the market was too small (8 or 10 
participants in this experiment while Hamman et al. (2010) had 15), that is why we run an ED treatment 
where we had 15 participants per session. The results do not substantially vary as we can see in Appendix 
D.  




Table 4: Percentage of delegated decisions and amount redistributed by rounds 




  Agent Principal 
(1-4) 51% 4.32 3.91 
(5-8) 48% 3.66 2.97 
 (9-12) 47% 3.50 2.60 
 
 
4.3. Agent selection 
Now, we look at Hypothesis 4 that states that agents making decisions that are 
favorable to the principal will be selected more often in the (delegation) treatments CD 
and ED-D. We find that the average amount shared by agents that are not chosen by 
principals in the next round in CD is 3.89. This is well above the average amount shared 
by those who are selected again, 1.81. Clearly agents that allocate smaller amounts to the 
receiver are selected more often. The same behavior carry over to ED but principals 
“react” less to lower amounts redistributed to recipients. Principal’s switch the decision 
maker when the amount allocated is on average 4.12 and they do not change their 
delegation strategy when the amount is 2.86 (the difference is lower but still significant 
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t=-5.70, p=0.00). Moreover, principals switch the decision maker more often in ED (49%) 
than in CD (37%).21,22 
To better understand the mechanism by which agents are chosen by principals we 
performed a series of logistic regressions (with subjects fixed effects) for CD and ED 
treatments (Table 5).23,24 Model 1 and Model 2 analyze the CD data, their dependent 
variable is a dummy with value one if the principal decides to switch agents after that 
round and zero otherwise. In Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 the data examined is from ED. Model 
3 and 4 have as dependent variable a dummy with value one if principals switch from 
delegating to not delegating and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Model 5 and 
6 is a dummy with value one if the agent changes the decision maker in any way (from 
agents to principal, principal to agents or from one agent to another) from one round to 
another, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are the same for all the models: 
the amount allocated to recipients in the previous period and a variable to control for the 
round after which they decide to switch the decision maker (only on models 2, 4 and 6). 
Looking at CD, models 1 and 2, the variable amount allocated to recipients in the 
previous round is positive and significant (0.23 and 0.24 respectively) at a 1% level. This 
indicates that in CD principals switch agents in a round when the previously selected 
agent allocated higher amounts to the recipient. Agents that are selected are those 
allocating lower amounts to recipients. Models 3 and 4 provides us a lower coefficient 
associated with the amount given in previous periods by agents (0.11 and 0.10), this 
coefficient is also significant at a 1% level. Principals, in this case, switch from delegating 
to not delegating when the amount allocated in the previous round is low. Meanwhile, 
Models 5 and 6 indicate that in ED higher amounts allocated to the recipient mean a 
higher likelihood of a change in strategy in the next round. Note that the size of the 
coefficients associated with the amount transferred (0.14 and 0.13) is smaller than in the 
CD treatment. In ED principals do switch due to higher amounts redistributed, but the 
effect is considerably smaller than in CD. The coefficient associated with round is never 
significant.  
                                                 
21 In CD they can switch from one agent to another while in ED they can also switch from an agent to not 
delegating and from not delegating to one of the agents. 
22Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix B represent the proportion of switching in decision maker under ED and CD 
over time. Switching decreases over time. 
23We excluded the last round from the regressions to avoid the end game effect. 
24 The results hold if, instead of including subject fixed-effects, we cluster errors by subject. We estimated 
additional random effect models including other demographic variables of the principal and agents such 
as the gender of the decision maker and their age. This does not affect the results. 
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This result is in line with the previous literature (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling 
and Fischbacher, 2012) where they argue that principals select those agents who share 
less with recipients. However, the coefficients associated with the amount shared are 
smaller for ED than for CD. Under CD principals are more prone to switch agents if the 
amount earned is small, this hints that competition between agents in CD is greater than 
under ED. It is not clear why this occurs. One potential explanation is that agents in CD 
understand that principals switch agents when they transfer more to recipients and thus 
start transferring lower amounts each round.  
This is, however, not the case under ED. Under ED, principals also switch their 
strategy when they get lower amounts, but in a more moderate way. Consequently, agents 
may not realize the relationship between lower amounts and switching strategy in ED and 
do not use lower amounts allocated to recipients as a strategy to be selected by principals 
over time. This theory is supported when we analyze the data from agents’ perspective. 
There is a clear relationship between higher profits for agents (more principals selecting 
the agent) and lower amounts reallocated to recipients in CD. We do not find this in ED 
Table 5: Switching in round t based on round t-1 
 CD ED 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 
6 
Amount allocated 

















































-The number in parenthesis represents the total amount of principals observed rather 
than the amount of observations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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where amounts reallocated to recipients by agents are not connected to the agents’ own 
profits. (See Table 2 in Appendix B for a detailed analysis of agent behavior). This gives 
us Result 4: 
Result 4: Under endogenous delegation, principals switch agents when they 
allocate higher amounts to recipients, however, the reaction is small and as a result 
agents do not reallocate lower amounts to recipients. Under compulsory delegation 




It is important to point out that our baseline (dictator game) and compulsory 
delegation treatments’ results are consistent with the existing literature. That is, 
principal’s act as profit maximizers and select agents that maximize their payoffs. We 
have also replicated other treatments in Hamman et al. (2010) with similar qualitative 
results. 
One of the outcomes of allowing for endogenous delegation is that under no-
delegation the standard dictator game is obtained. We find that when individuals self-
select into the role of the dictator they allocate significantly less to the receiver. 
Meanwhile, those that delegate the decision to an agent are more prosocial and on average 
delegate more. Interestingly, the distributional consequences of compulsory delegation 
and not delegating are to increase inequality while inequality is less under the standard 
dictator game and endogenous delegation (ED-D). 
Lower allocations obtained under ED-N is along similar lines as the results 
obtained under the procedural manipulation of Hoffman et al. (1996) and Cherry et al. 
(2002). We do not obtain strong results as in Cherry et al (2002) where 95% of the 
outcome are in line with game theoretic predictions, however, one would not expect this 
given that the manipulation is subtle. The results regardless are un-expected with 
allocations significantly decreased. It seems that allowing for individuals to sort into 
delegators and non-delegators results in more and less pro-social. An analysis of the 
frequency of delegation and the amount transferred confirms a negative relationship 
between frequency of no-delegation and the amount transferred. 
We also find that under ED-D, the outcomes are more pro-social. This is along the 
lines of previous studies (Dana et al. 2006; Dana et al. 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 
2009; Grossman 2014) who find that subjects do not always want to face the outcome of 
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an unfair decision. Along this line Lazear et al. (2012) find that when subjects can avoid 
sharing environments, sharing decreases. We find that the less pro-social choose to 
allocate as a dictator while the more pro-social delegate. The result in Collins et al. (2018) 
is also among similar lines. That is, allocation decisions are lower when they are made by 
someone who bought or purchased the right to make the division compared to a subject 
who earned this privilege randomly. In our experiment there is random allocation of roles 
but in endogenous delegation the principal can keep the right to make the decision. 
Following previous literature, it may be the case that principals in endogenous delegation 
feel more entitled to share less than principals in the baseline. Similarly, another 
explanation could be the role of responsibility (Charness, 2000). The responsibility of the 
decision lies in the principal more under endogenous delegation as the principal can 
actively avoid unfair situations. 
Finally, we ruled out any possible information effect that could explain these 
results implementing two different endogenous delegation treatments, one with 
information on principals’ possible choices and another on which agents did not know 
that they were also competing with the principal (informationally closer to compulsory 
delegation). The results of these two treatments are identical suggesting that information 
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Figure 1A: Amounts allocated by the recipient by round when they delegate 




Overall we find that ED-1 and ED-2 give us similar results. The average 
shared amount with recipients in ED-1 is 3.47, not statistically significantly 
different from the average transferred amount in ED-2, 3.49 (, z= 0.383, p= 
0.701 in a Mann-Whitney test). 
 
 In both treatments roughly half of the decisions were delegated, hinting 
that principals’ behavior and did not change either. Moreover, as we can see in 
Figure 1, in both treatments selected agents reallocated higher amounts to 
recipients than principals, ED-1: 3.28 if they do not delegate, 3.70 when they 
delegate (z=-0.494, p=0.62); ED-2: 2.89 when they do not delegate, 4 when they 
delegate (z=4.84 ,p=0.00). We thus conclude that the information in the 
experiment does not matter in terms of agent’s outcomes. Given this we pool the 












Figure 2B: Average amounts transferred to the recipient given number of times that the 
subject decided not to delegate. 
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Figure 3B: Percentage switching from one decision maker to another by round in CD 
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Table 1B: Seven item scale, form strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (+3) with a 
neutral option (0) 
 BS CD ED 
Player P R P R A P R A 
I feel personally 




















The total profit 
obtained was 


















I consider my 



















Players A with 
which I interacted 












Players C with 
which I interacted 
had an acceptable 
behaviour 
-------- -------- 1.41 
(1.62) 
-------- -------- 1.05 
(1.43) 
-------- -------- 


















Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis 
 
Table 2 presents two regressions using the data from agents. The dependent 
variable will be the average allocation made by agents to principals in a round while the 
set of independent variables will include if the agent sees that he has been less chosen 
and therefore earned less profit (profit) and the round they are in. Generalized least 
squares regressions with cluster-robust standard errors are used as estimation method. In 
Model 1, the data analyzed is CD and in Model 2 ED. 
 
There is a clear relationship between higher profits for agents and lower amounts 
reallocated to recipients in CD as the coefficient associated to agents profit is negative 
and significant. We do not find this in ED as the coefficient associated to profits is not 
significant. 
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Table 2B: Amounts reallocated by agents depending on the profit obtained by them per 
round 
 CD ED 
 Model 1 Model 2 












Observed agents 10  34 
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APPENDIX C: Compulsory and Endogenous delegation extra treatment 
This graph presents the results of a 6 round CD and 6 rounds ED treatment. The 
treatment had 70 participants playing in 5 different sessions. We obtain the same results 
as in Hamman et al. (2010), where the outcome of ED after some rounds of CD converge 
to CD. 
 










































APPENDIX D: Endogenous delegation with bigger market size extra treatment. 
 
The extra treatment (from now on ED-big) had 45 participants playing in 
3 different sessions. Following Hamman et al. (2010) we had 7 principals, 3 agents 
and 7 recipients per session. The results obtained in ED-big are similar to those in 
ED. The only difference can be found in some deviations in the average amounts 
shared with recipients that are lower in ED-big (2.97) than in ED (3.47). This 
difference in quantities is probably due to the change in the number of 
participants. We observe the same tendency to transfer less in bigger groups  when 
we compare our results in BS and CD (8 or 10 participants per session) with those 
of Hamman et al. (2010) (12 or 15 participants per session).25 
The main results remain the same. First, the amount of decisions delegated 
are in both cases around 50% (52% in ED-big and 49% in ED) and second the 
average amounts shared by agents are significantly higher than the amounts 
shared by principals when there is no delegation (z= 5.56, p= 0.00 in a Mann-
Whitney test). Figure 1 contains the average amounts transferred by principals 
and agents in the treatment and when agents and principals delegate.  
 
Figure 1D: Amounts earned by the recipient by round and treatment 
 
                                                 
25 In our treatments with small groups the average amount transferred by the principals on the BS 
treatment is 3.56.  Meanwhile, in the CD treatment the average shared amount is 2.55. In Hamman et al. 
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APPENDIX E: Instructions 
 
- Treatment 1: Dictator Game 
 
Thanks for participating in the experiment! 
 
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the experiment no 
communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment please raise your hand 
and we will answer your question in private. 
 
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the experiment will get 
to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your identity will only be used to 
ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read the instructions with care. After reading 
them and before starting the game we will provide each participant with a graphical 
example of the experiment. 
 
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment we will use 
the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At the end of the experiment 
we will transform this amount in the local currency using an exchange rate of 1. Notice 
that we will add 5 EM show up fee to your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your 
private information.  
 
Experiment: 
The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is the 
following. 
 
There are two types of players in this experiment: player A and player B.  
 
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identification 
number by the computer. Whether you will be Player A or B is determined (randomly) by 
the computer. 
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In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. Each pair, A-B, 
will be assigned 10 EM. We will now explain the structure of the game. 
 
Each period: 
At the start of each period, player A decides how to allocate 10 EM to player B 
and herself. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent of EM. The amount of 
10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the amount assigned to 
player B plus the amount player A decides to keep will always add to 10 EM. 
 
Once player A has taken their decision, each player will be informed about the 
amount they have been assigned. 
 
At the end of each period all players, A and B, will see the information regarding 
current and previous periods, the identification numbers of their pairings and the amount 
assigned to them in each period. 
 
Payment: 
Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each particiant will be paid in the following 
manner. 
 
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen for each 
player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned in that period. In 
addition, subjects will earn 2 EM for completing two short questionnaires 
 
 
You will be called individually at the end of the experiment to be paid. You will 
inform the experimenter about you ID number and will be paid accordingly. 
 
      Any questions? 
 
- Treatment 2: Endogenous Delegation (ED-1) 
 
   Thanks for participating in the experiment! 
 
    
31  
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the experiment no 
communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment please raise your hand 
and we will answer your question in private. 
 
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the experiment will get 
to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your identity will only be used to 
ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read the instructions with care. After reading 
them and before starting the game we will provide each participant with a graphical 
example of the experiment. 
 
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment we will use 
the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At the end of the experiment 
we will transform this amount in your currency using an exchange rate of 1. Notice that 
we will add 5 EM show up fees to your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your 




The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is the 
following. 
 
There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B and player 
C.  
 
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identification 
number by the computer. The computer will also inform you regarding the type of player 
you have been chosen to be. 
 
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. There will also 
be two C players. 
 
At the start of the period 10 EM will be assigned to each pairing (A-B). We will 
now explain the structure of the experiment. 
 





Player A’s screen will show two boxes. Each box contains one of the two Players 
C and the option Myself.  
 
Each player A has to select if the decision of dividing the experimental money is 
taken by one of the two C players or by player A (option Myself). To select an 
option,Player A simply needs to click on the associated box. 
 
If A chooses player C, then player C decides how to divide the 10 EM between 
each pair of players A and B. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent. The 
amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the amount 
assigned to player B and player A always adds to 10 EM. 
 
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A,B) is independent of the allocation 
made to another pair (if player C has been chosen by more than one player). If a player C 
has not been chosen by any player (A) then their screen will show a waiting message. 
 
If Player A chooses the option Myself, the division of the money will be done by 
A. 
 
Once all players have made their decisions, each player A and B will then be 
informed about the amount they have been assigned. In addition, all players will see a 
table containing all the information regarding previous periods. 
Once all players A have made their decisions, player C is informed about the 
number of players A who have chosen him. Each decision maker (A or C) decides how to 
allocate 10 EM between players A and B. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 
cent. The amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the 
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Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the following 
manner. 
 
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen for each 
player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned for that period. That is, 
this will be the amount that was allocated to them by player C in that period. 
 
At the start of the experiment each player C is given an additional quantity of 5 
EM However, player C loses 0.30 EM in each period and earns 0.15 EM for each player 
that selects him. Player C´s earnings are the total sum of the earnings in the entire 
experiment. 
 
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid. You will 




Treatment 3: Endogenous Delegation without Information (ED-2) 
 
Thanks for participating in the experiment! 
 
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the experiment no 
communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment please raise your hand 
and we will answer your question in private. 
 
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the experiment will get 
to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your identity will only be used to 
ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read the instructions with care. After reading 
them and before starting the game we will provide each participant with a graphical 
example of the experiment. 
 
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment we will use 
the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At the end of the experiment 
we will transform this amount in your currency using an exchange rate of 1. Notice that 
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we will add 5 EM show up fees to your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your 




The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is the 
following. 
 
There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B and player 
C.  
 
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identification 
number by the computer. The computer will also inform you regarding the type of player 
you have been chosen to be. 
 
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. There will also 
be two C players. 
 
At the start of the period 10 EM will be assigned to each pairing (A-B). We will 
now explain the structure of the experiment. 
 
Each period: 
Each player A has to decide to delegate or not the decision of dividing the 
endowment on one of the two C players. To select an option, Player A simply needs to 
click on the associated box. 
 
If A chooses a player C, then player C decides how to divide the 10 EM between 
each pair of players A and B. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent. The 
amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the amount 
assigned to player B and player A always adds to 10 EM. 
 
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A, B) is independent of the allocation 
made to another pair (if player C has been chosen by more than one player). If a player C 
has not been chosen by any player (A) then their screen will show a waiting message. 
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Once all players have made their decisions, each player A and B will then be 
informed about the amount they have been assigned. In addition, all players will see a 
table containing all the information regarding previous periods. 
Once all players A have made their decisions, player C is informed about the 
number of players A who have chosen him. Each decision maker (A or C) decides how to 
allocate 10 EM between players A and B. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 
cent. The amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the 




Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the following 
manner. 
 
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen for each 
player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned for that period. That is, 
this will be the amount that was allocated to them by player C in that period. 
 
At the start of the experiment each player C is given an additional quantity of 5 
EM However, player C loses 0.30 EM in each period and earns 0.15 EM for each player 
that selects him. Player C´s earnings are the total sum of the earnings in the entire 
experiment. 
 
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid. You will 




- Treatment 4: Compulsory delegation 
 
Thanks for participating in the experiment! 
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Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the experiment no 
communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment please raise your hand 
and we will answer your question in private. 
 
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the experiment will get 
to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your identity will only be used to 
ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read the instructions with care. After reading 
them and before starting the game we will provide each participant with a graphical 
example of the experiment. 
 
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment we will use 
the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At the end of the experiment 
we will transform this amount in the local currency using an exchange rate of 1. Notice 
that we will add 5 EM show up fee to your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your 




The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is the 
following. 
 
There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B and player 
C.  
 
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identification 
number by the computer. The computer will also inform you regarding the type of player 
you have been chosen to be. 
 
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. There will also 
be two independent C players. 
 
At the start of the period 10 EM will be assigned to each pairing (A-B). We will 
now explain the structure of the game. 
 




Player A’s screen will show two boxes. Each box contains the ID’s of one of the 
two players C. Player A needs to choose from one of the two players C by clicking on the 
associated box. The chosen C will decide how to allocate the 10 EM between players A 
and B.  
 
The selected player C decides how to divide the 10 EM between each pair of 
players A and B. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent. The amount of 10 
EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the amount assigned to player 
B and player A always adds to 10 EM. 
 
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A,B) is independent of the allocation 
made to another pair (if player C has been chosen by more than one player). If a player C 




Once players C have made their decisions, each player A and B will be informed 
about the amount they have been assigned. In addition, all players will see a table 





Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the following 
manner. 
 
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen for each 
player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned for that period. That is, 
this will be the amount that was allocated to them by player C in that period. 
 
At the start of the experiment each player C is given an additional quantity of 5 
EM However, player C loses 0.30 EM in each period and earns 0.15 EM for each player 
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that selects him. Player C´s earnings are the total sum of the earnings in the entire 
experiment. 
 
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid. You will 
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